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ROBUST PORTFOLIOS AND WEAK INCENTIVES
IN LONG-RUN INVESTMENTS
PAOLO GUASONI, JOHANNES MUHLE-KARBE, AND HAO XING
ABSTRACT. When the planning horizon is long, and the safe asset grows indefinitely,
isoelastic portfolios are nearly optimal for investors who are close to isoelastic for
high wealth, and not too risk averse for low wealth. We prove this result in a general
arbitrage-free, frictionless, semimartingale model. As a consequence, optimal portfo-
lios are robust to the perturbations in preferences induced by common option compen-
sation schemes, and such incentives are weaker when their horizon is longer. Robust
option incentives are possible, but require several, arbitrarily large exercise prices, and
are not always convex.
1. INTRODUCTION
Investors pursue long-term goals both by managing their portfolios, and by designing
incentives, such as stock and option grants, to align managers’ actions with their inter-
ests. This paper explores the implications of long-term investment for both portfolio
choice and incentive contracts, overcoming their traditional separation in the literature,
and some puzzling results that this separation has generated.
The main message in the literature for long-term portfolio choice comes from turn-
pike theorems:1 when the horizon is distant, optimal portfolios depend only on prefer-
ences at high levels of wealth, hence a generic investor should invest like an isoelastic
investor with the same asymptotic risk aversion.2 These theorems are welcome news
for long-term investors who seek simple portfolio allocation strategies, as they imply
that local differences in preferences are irrelevant at long horizons, and allow to focus
on the one-parameter family of isoelastic strategies.
However, turnpike theorems also have unsettling implications for managers’ com-
pensation. When investors offer incentive stock options to a manager, the incentive is
a perturbation of the manager’s preferences. If turnpike theorems hold, they imply that
incentive schemes lose their strength as their horizon (i.e., vesting period) increases.
The central goal of this paper is to understand the extent and the limits of this effect –
and its potential remedies.
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Our main result provides conditions on preferences under which, for a long hori-
zon, an isoelastic portfolio is approximately optimal for a generic investor. This is
not another turnpike theorem: while turnpikes show that generic portfolios are close
to isoelastic portfolios when the horizon is distant, we show that the welfare loss to an
investor who uses an isoelastic portfolio throughout the entire period is negligible – in
relative monetary terms. That is, the fraction of wealth lost by using a simple isoelastic
portfolio rather than the exact, but more complex, optimal portfolio, declines to zero as
the planning horizon increases. This result holds in a general semimartingale market
without arbitrage opportunities, in which the safe asset grows indefinitely.
To appreciate the strength of this result, compare this welfare effect with that of a
small reduction in the interest rate. Compounded over a long horizon, a lower interest
rate translates into a large relative decline in wealth, as the ratio between investments
growing at different rates diverges. From this viewpoint, isoelastic portfolios are sur-
prisingly robust – and incentives remarkably weak.
The message of this result is as positive for portfolio choice as it is negative for
typical incentive schemes (those based on options with strike price near the money):
if, at long horizons, the optimal strategy for an investor is robust to local perturbations
in preferences, then, by the same token, a manager’s policy is insensitive to common
stock and option grants, which modify preferences only locally. Thus, to be effective
at long horizons, an incentive contract must modify preferences at levels much higher
than current wealth.
We argue that incentive contracts based on options with several, arbitrarily high
strike prices are robust to the horizon. A simple example is a (multiple of a) con-
tract that pays one option for each strike price in a regularly spaced grid: its payoff
is approximately the underlying assets’s squared price, and the value of the contract is
finite in most common models.3
Our main result is a natural complement to the extant turnpike literature. The latter
compares, as the horizon increases, optimal portfolios for generic investors to optimal
portfolios of isoelastic investors with the same horizon, and establishes joint restrictions
on markets and preferences, under which these portfolios are close. Put differently, the
question is whether the optimizers of the two maximization problems are similar at
the early stages of the investment process. A natural practical question (but, some-
what unnaturally, not addressed in the literature) is whether these maximizers are good
substitutes: if a generic investor chooses to use an isoelastic portfolio over the entire
investment horizon, then under which conditions will utility be close to optimal, and in
which sense? Although such a result is plausible, there are two potential pitfalls.
First, turnpike theorems only assert that optimizers are close at the beginning, not
necessarily at the end, of the period. Thus, switching a portfolio with another may
have dreadful results if they grow apart as time passes – a concrete possibility, since
even optimal isoelastic portfolios shift between the beginning and at the end of the
period.4 Second, the generic investor may have nearly isoelastic preferences at high
wealth levels, but may be far more risk averse for very low wealth, and it is unclear
whether such bad states have a negligible effect, even in the long run. This concern is
especially relevant when the isoelastic portfolio is very risky.
3In Black and Scholes’ model, the price of the contract e−σ
2TS2T is S
2
0 , i.e., the square of the current
stock price. This contract is replicated by a portfolio with equal weights in call options of all strikes.
4Guasoni and Robertson (2012) show examples in which the long-run optimal portfolio has utility equal
to negative infinity, if used over the entire period.
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The main result of the present study clarifies these issues in a general setting. It also
helps to reconcile some of the puzzling, or at least counterintuitive results in the liter-
ature on executive compensation. Jensen and Meckling (1976) already recognized that
managers of large publicly held corporations seem to behave in a risk averse way to the
detriment of the equity holders, as projects with positive net present value may be fore-
gone to avoid additional risk. Stock-based compensation attempts to align managers’
interests with those of shareholders, but may also backfire, leading managers to engage
in hedging activities, as predicted by Amihud and Lev (1981) as well as Smith and
Stulz (1985), and confirmed empirically by May (1995). As a remedy, option-based
incentives aim at rewarding managerial risk-taking by introducing convexity in their
payoffs. The intuition, which finds its roots in the familiar notion that prices of options
with convex payoffs increase with volatility, is that the asymmetric payoffs of call op-
tions make it more attractive for managers to undertake risky projects. (DeFusco et al.,
1990). However, Carpenter (2000) and Ross (2004) show that this intuition is mislead-
ing: with a nontradeable option, the manager will focus on its private reservation value
(that is, the certainty equivalent) rather than on its risk-neutral value, and the effect
of convex incentives is ambiguous in general. In a full-information model with risk-
sharing, Cadenillas, Cvitanic´, and Zapatero (2007) characterize optimal contracts, and
also find that they may be either convex or concave. The numerical results of Larsen
(2005) also lead to a similar conclusion.
Adding to the debate, Hall and Murphy (2000) argue that the standard practice of
awarding stock options with exercise price equal to the stock price at grant date, po-
tentially motivated by a favorable accounting treatment, is suboptimal, and find that
optimal exercise prices are generally higher. Cadenillas et al. (2004) also find that op-
timal exercise prices increase with manager performance and firm size. Edmans et al.
(2012) note the dynamic problems with option compensation: securities given to incen-
tivize the CEO may lose their power over time: if firm value declines, options may fall
out of the money and bear little sensitivity to the stock price. In fact, this issue motivates
the common industry practice of “repricing”, that is resetting the exercise price after a
sharp drop in the stock price (Acharya et al., 2000; Chen, 2004), a custom that has
attracted criticism for rewarding poor performance and weakening original incentives.
Our results clarify the interplay between the exercise price and the horizon in option
compensation. If the exercise price is held constant, the option loses its effect as the
horizon increases, in that its certainty equivalent becomes arbitrarily small compared to
the manager’s wealth. By contrast, an incentive contract with multiple exercise prices
remains effective even after large changes in the stock price, and for long horizons.
Multiple exercise prices also shed light on the ambiguous effects of option grants,
and convex incentives in general, on managerial risk-taking. The intuition is that (Carr
and Madan, 2001) a portfolio of call and put options can recreate any regular function of
the underlying, including incentive contracts of power type xα, α > 0. If the manager’s
risk aversion is high, the incentives contracts that reduce it correspond to 0 < α <
1, hence are concave, not convex. By contrast, a manager with low risk aversion is
motivated to take risks by a package of call options with all strikes, and this convex
incentive is robust to changes in stock prices and to long horizons.
Finally, note that this paper focuses on the effects of compensation contracts based
on combinations of cash, stock, and options, which are prevalent in practice, but it does
not investigate their optimality for a possible principal. (See Bolton and Dewatripont
(2005) and Cvitanic´ and Zhang (2013) for recent surveys in contract theory.) On the
other hand, our results allow considerable flexibility in both investment opportunities
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and preferences, shedding new light on the effect of the horizon in typical compensation
contracts.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the model, and
presents the main result and its implications. Section 3 lays the groundwork for the
proof of the main result, recalling the general duality results of Bouchard et al. (2004)
and some auxiliary results that will be used repeatedly in the sequel. The main result
is proved for power utilities (p 6= 0) in Section 4, and for logarithmic utility (p = 0) in
Section 5. Finally, Section 6 contains a counterexample illustrating the necessity of our
assumptions.
2. MAIN RESULT
2.1. Model and Main Result. We focus on an agent who invests in assets S, thereby
affecting total wealth X , as to maximize expected utility from terminal wealth XT at
time T :
(2.1) max
X admissible
E[U(XT )] .
To encompass the applications below, the utility function U is strictly increasing and
concave, but not necessarily continuously differentiable or strictly concave. The model
(2.1) has the usual portfolio choice interpretation, in which the agent is an investor,
S represents the financial asset(s), X the portfolio value, and U the investor’s utility
function. A second interpretation is that of the agent as a corporate manager, S a real
investment opportunity, and X the firm’s value. In this case, the function U combines
the manager’s preferences and incentives: for example, if the manager receives a com-
pensation equal to F (XT ) and has utility function u, then U(x) = u(F (x)). A hybrid
interpretation (cf. Carpenter (2000)) is that of a fund manager, who invests in financial
assets S, as to maximize the expected payoff of some function U of the terminal fund
value.
Formally, there are d + 1 assets available. A safe asset, with price denoted by S0,
and d risky assets, with prices S = (S1, . . . , Sd). These assets are traded continuously,
without frictions, and no arbitrage opportunities are available. Let (Ω,F , (Ft)t≥0, P )
be a filtered probability space satisfying the usual conditions of right-continuity and
saturatedness.
Assumption 2.1 (Assets). The safe asset S0 : [0,∞) 7→ R is a deterministic, strictly
positive function satisfying S0t ↑ ∞ as t ↑ ∞.5
Moreover, the discounted prices S/S0 of the risky assets are local martingales under
some probability Q equivalent to P .
The above assumption limt→∞ S0t = ∞ is satisfied, for example, in models with
positive interest rates bounded away from zero. The existence of a martingale measure
ensures that the market is free of arbitrage opportunities (cf. Delbaen and Schacher-
mayer (1998)).
The agent’s objective is described by a utility function U , which incorporates the
combined effect of preferences and incentives. Henceforth, fix p < 1, and denote
by U˜(x) the isoelastic utility function, defined by U˜(x) = xp/p, 0 6= p < 1, resp.
U˜(x) = log(x) for p = 0. Compared to the benchmark U˜ , the generic utility function
U satisfies the following restrictions, which yield the main result.
5If the utility function is strictly concave and continuously differentiable, the safe asset can be sto-
chastic as long as it is bounded from below and above by two deterministic processes S and S such that
limt→∞ St =∞; cf. Remark 3.2.
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Assumption 2.2 (Utility).
i) U(x) : (0,∞) → R is strictly increasing, concave, not necessarily differentiable
or strictly concave for low wealth levels, but differentiable and strictly concave for
large enough wealth.
ii) As wealth increases (x ↑ ∞), the utility U becomes similar to the isoelastic utility
U˜ , in that their marginal utilities are asymptotically equivalent:
(2.2) lim
x↑∞
U ′(x)
U˜ ′(x)
= 1.
iii) The utility U satisfies additional conditions at low wealth levels, depending on the
sign of p in U˜(x) = xp/p :
a) For 0 < p < 1, U is bounded from below;
b) For p = 0, i.e., U˜(x) = log(x),
(2.3) lim inf
x↓0
U(x)
U˜ ′(x)
> −∞.
c) For p < 0, limx↑∞ U(x) = 0 and (2.3) is satisfied.
Condition i) implies that the agent is risk averse when wealth is high. Condition ii)
requires that, when the agent is rich, the utility (either by preferences or by incentives) is
close to isoelastic, which is the central assumption in turnpike theorems. In particular,
(2.2) implies that U satisfies the Inada condition at infinity, i.e., limx↑∞ U ′(x) = 0.
However, the Inada condition may not be satisfied at zero.
Condition iii) is new, and requires that U is not too risk averse compared to U˜ when
wealth is low. For example, if U(x) = xp
∗
/p∗ for x small, where p∗ < 1, the condition
in (2.3) boils down to p∗ ≥ p − 1, that is, the risk aversion 1 − p∗ of U should not
be greater than one plus the risk aversion 1 − p of U˜ at low wealth. In general, (2.3)
means that the ratio of utilities U(x)/U˜(x) does not diverge faster than x−1 for p 6= 0
or (x log x)−1 for p = 0, as the wealth x tends to zero. These conditions are satisfied,
in particular, if the ratio between U and U˜ remains bounded near zero. The example
outlined in Section 2.3 and analyzed in Section 6 below shows that if (2.3) is dropped,
the main result can fail even in the Black-Scholes model.
The agent invests in the assets subject to the usual budget constraint: if x denotes
the initial capital, and (ϕit)
1≤i≤d
0≤t≤T the number of shares on the i-th asset at time t, the
corresponding wealth Xϕt equals
Xϕt = S
0
t
(
x+
∫ t
0
ϕsd(Ss/S
0
s )
)
.
To simplify notation, without loss of generality we set x = 1, which amounts to scaling
the numeraire by a factor of x. An Rd-valued process ϕ is an admissible strategy if it is
predictable, S-integrable, and the corresponding wealth process satisfies Xϕt ≥ 0 a.s.
for all t ≥ 0. The class of admissible wealth processes is denoted by
X := {X : Xt ≥ 0,P− a.s. for all t ≥ 0}.
Thus, the value functions for the utility maximization problems for the generic utility
U and its isoelastic counterpart U˜ are:
(2.4) uT (x) = sup
X∈X
E[U(X)] and u˜T (x) = sup
X∈X
E[U˜(X)].
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The final assumption is that the isoelastic utility maximization problem is well posed.
This assumption is necessary only for p ≥ 0 because it is always satisfied if the utility
function is bounded from above for p < 0:
Assumption 2.3 (Isoelastic Wellposedness). If 0 ≤ p < 1, let
V˜ (y) =
{
−yq/q for p ∈ (0, 1) and q = p/(p− 1),
− log(y)− 1 for p = 0,
be the convex dual of the isoelastic utility U˜ , and assume that
(2.5) inf
Y ∈Y
E[V˜ (YT )] <∞,
where Y is the set of stochastic discount factors:
Y := {Y = Y /S0 : Y > 0 with Y 0 = 1 such that XY is a supermartingale
for all X ∈ X}.
Condition (2.5) ensures that the isoelastic dual (and in turn primal) problem is well
posed. For p 6= 0, this requires the existence of the q-th moment for some stochastic
discount factor, which is satisfied, for example, if the asset price follows an Itô pro-
cess, and the market price of risk is bounded. Indeed, in this case one can choose the
density process of the minimal martingale measure, and (2.5) follows from Novikov’s
condition. The argument for p = 0 is similar.
With the above notation and assumptions, the main result reads as follows.
THEOREM 2.4 (Robustness of Isoelastic Portfolios) Let Assumptions 2.1 - 2.3 hold.
Then for any horizon T > 0 there exist an optimal payoff XTT for the generic utility U
and X˜TT for the isoelastic utility U˜ .
6 They satisfy
(2.6) lim
T→∞
U−1(E[U(X˜TT )])
U−1(E[U(XTT )])
= 1.
That is, in the long run, the certainty equivalent of the isoelastic portfolio is arbitrarily
close in relative terms to that of the optimizer.
The strength of this result is that the certainty equivalents converge – not just their
growth rates. In contrast, the long-run portfolio choice literature based on risk-sensitive
control7 and large deviations8 focuses on the maximization of the equivalent safe rate,
defined as:
lim inf
T→∞
1
T
logU−1(E[U(XT )]).
It is clear that if two processes (Xt)t≥0 and (X˜t)t≥0 satisfy (2.6), then they share the
same equivalent safe rate (if it exists). It is also clear, however, that (2.6) is a much
stronger property. As a trivial example, even with a risk-neutral utility (U(x) = x),
consider the two processes X˜t = e(µ−σ
2/2)t+σWt , Xt = 12e
rt + 12e
(µ−σ2/2)t+σWt ,
which correspond to a full stock investment, and to a half-stock, half-bond investment
(without rebalancing) in a safe asset earning a constant interest rate r and a stock fol-
lowing geometric Brownian motion with expected return µ > r and volatility σ. Then,
both wealth processes have the same growth rate µ, but the ratio of the correspond-
ing certainty equivalents converges to 2. In fact, examples are also available, in which
6Here, the superscript T indicates the optimal wealth process for horizon T , whereas the subscript T
refers to its evaluation at time T .
7See Fleming and McEneaney (1995), Bielecki and Pliska (1999; 2000), and several others.
8Pham (2003), Föllmer and Schachermayer (2007)
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such a ratio diverges while the equivalent safe rate remains equal. Thus, even if two
investment policies share the same equivalent safe rate, they may have very different
certainty equivalents, which means that the agent may value one policy much higher
than the other.
When (2.6) holds, however, the optimal policy can only be marginally better than
its isoelastic counterpart for long horizons, in that the gain from choosing the superior
policy is smaller than any fraction of the value of the inferior one. It is precisely this
property that makes the theorem relevant for incentive schemes, and the next section
explores in detail the theorem’s implications in this area.
2.2. Incentives.
Weakness of incentives with one exercise price. If a manager has isoelastic preferences
(U˜(x) = xp/p with 0 6= p < 1), and compensation that includes a cash component
c1 ≥ 0 and a fraction c2 > 0 of the equity Xt, the objective function is
(2.7) E[U˜(c1 + c2XT )],
where X runs through the class of admissible wealth processes. Suppose now that
shareholders are concerned that the manager’s high equity exposure is likely to discour-
age investment in projects with positive expected value, and are contemplating to grant
c3 > 0 call options with exercise price K, as an incentive to take risks. Such executive
stock options typically have a vesting period of ten years, so that our focus on long
horizons is relevant. Including the option grant, the manager maximizes the objective
(2.8) E[U˜(c1 + c2XT + c3(XT −K)+)].
Both the optimizer and the certainty equivalent of this problem are the same as for
(2.9) E[U¯(XT )] ,
where U¯(x) = U˜(c1 + c2x + c3(x − K)+)/(c2 + c3)p. In other words, awarding
the option grant is equivalent to replacing the individual utility U˜ with the effective
utility U¯ . This utility U¯ is strictly increasing, differentiable on (K,∞), and satisfies
U¯(∞) = 0 if p < 0 as well as
(2.10) lim
x↑∞
U¯ ′(x)
U˜ ′(x)
= 1, lim
x↓0
U¯(x)
U˜ ′(x)
= 0.
Thus, the effective utility U¯ satisfies Assumption 2 for any fixed compensation c1 ≥ 0,
with the exception that U¯ is no longer concave in a neighborhood of the exercise price
K, which is illustrated in Figure 1. Indeed, creating such a region is the main purpose
of option incentives.
Carpenter (2000) in a lognormal model and Bichuch and Sturm (2012) in a more
general setting9 show that maximizing the expected utility U¯ is actually equivalent to
maximizing its concave envelope U , that is, the minimal concave function that domi-
nates U¯ :
(2.11) E[U(XT )], where U(x) = inf{g(x) : g concave, g ≥ U¯}.
In the present setting, the concave envelope coincides with U¯ for sufficiently large or
small wealth levels, therefore it preserves properties (2.10) of U¯ . Since it is also con-
cave, Theorem 2.4 applies to U , and yields the following result:
9Which includes a complete market where the unique equivalent martingale measure has no atoms, as
well as other settings.
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FIGURE 1. Effective utility function U¯ (solid) and corresponding
concave envelope U (dashed), for sample parameter values (γ = 1/2,
c1 = 1, c2 = 2, c3 = 3, K = 4).
THEOREM 2.5 If the manager’s problem (2.8) and the concavified problem (2.11) are
well posed and have the same solution, and the safe asset grows indefinitely then, as
the horizon increases, the certainty equivalents of the optimal strategies with incen-
tives (2.8) and without incentives (2.7) are asymptotically equivalent. In particular, the
manager’s private value of an option grant with fixed exercise price becomes relatively
negligible as the horizon increases.
With hindsight, this result looks natural, and indeed follows from the the local effect
on preferences of a single option. Yet, the option pricing intuition, which shapes much
of the literature on incentives, points to the opposite conclusion. Since in the Black-
Scholes model (and also in more sophisticated extensions) the arbitrage-free price of
a call option increases with volatility, it is plausible to conclude that a manager is en-
couraged to increase its value by taking more risk. A longer horizon also increases the
option’s value, suggesting a stronger, not weaker incentive effect.
However, option pricing heuristics are misleading in this context because the man-
ager, who can neither sell nor hedge the option grant,10 does not focus on the hy-
pothetical risk-neutral value of the option, but rather on its private value, for which
risk-aversion is central. Since a single option affects risk-aversion only locally, long
horizons combined with wealth growth make their impact vanish.
In summary, Theorem 2.4 supports the broad observation that the size and the ex-
ercise price of an option grant needs to be chosen carefully, depending on the horizon.
A small number of options with too low a strike may result, similar to a large stock
position, in discouraging risk-taking. A large number of options with too high strike
may also be ineffective, as the risk necessary to make the options profitable may be too
much for the manager to bear. And even an exercise price chosen optimally at the time
of award may soon become inadequate after large changes in the asset price.
10In practice, incentive stock options grants include clauses that prevent a manager from taking offsetting
positions even with private accounts.
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Robustness of several strike prices, and power(ful) incentives. We argue that option
grants that include several (in theory, infinitely many) exercise prices retain their in-
centive effects after large price changes, and are robust to long horizons. Once again,
the intuition comes from option theory: Carr and Madan (2001) show that a European
option with (smooth) payoff f(ST ) admits the following representation as a portfolio
of call and put options of all strikes:11
f(ST ) = f(K¯) + f
′(K¯)(ST − K¯)
+
∫ K¯
0
f ′′(k)(k − ST )+dk +
∫ ∞
K¯
f ′′(k)(ST − k)+dk.
(2.12)
In this representation, the term f(K¯) represents a cash amount, f ′(K¯)(ST − K¯) a
position in a forward contract, and the two integrals correspond to static portfolios in
puts and calls, respectively. The threshold K¯ is arbitrary, and determines the strike
above which calls rather than puts are used.
For example, setting K¯ = 0, this decomposition shows that a portfolio consisting of
an equal number of call options at all strikes leads to a payoff of the form f(x) = cx2
for some c > 0. In general, a payoff of power type f(x) = xα is replicated by a
portfolio of options with weights f ′′(x) = α(α − 1)xα−2. We restrict to α > 0, as
otherwise the incentive does not reward higher asset values.
Consider now the effect of such a power incentive on a manager with isoelastic utility
U˜(x) = xp/p. With fixed compensation set to zero for simplicity, the utility function
including incentives becomes U(x) = xαp/p, which means that the incentive replaces
the manager’s risk aversion γ = 1− p with the effective risk aversion:12
(2.13) γ∗ = αγ + (1− α).
This formula has several implications. First, the incentive scheme reduces risk aversion
(γ∗ < γ) if and only if (1 − α)(1 − γ) < 0. In particular, a convex payoff (α > 1)
does not reduce risk aversion if the latter is originally higher than logarithmic (γ > 1),
as it typically is. In general, a concave payoff (α < 1) makes a manager closer to
logarithmic γ = 1, and a convex payoff does the opposite.
Thus, for a manager who has an already low risk aversion (γ < 1), an options
grant that includes calls with several exercise prices is an incentive scheme that remains
robust to the horizon, and to large movements in the stock price, preventing the need
for future repricing.
The payoff of a concave incentive is qualitatively similar to that of a combination of
covered-call positions, but devising concave incentives may not be practical, because
they would imply large stock holdings, combined with short positions in options of all
maturities. The unusual nature of such arrangements, combined with the resulting dif-
ficulties for tax and accounting purposes, may make such schemes hard to implement.
In spite of these difficulties, note that the above formula shows that such concave
power incentive are implicit in the high-water mark provisions in the compensation of
hedge fund managers. Indeed, Guasoni and Obloj (2013) find that a hedge fund man-
ager with risk aversion γ, who receives as performance fee a fraction 1 − α of profits,
invests the fund’s assets like an owner-investor with the same effective risk aversion as
in (2.13). This observation shows that concave incentives, although virtually absent in
11The formula follows using the fundamental theorem of calculus twice, and then integrating by parts.
12Here, we suppose that the resulting optimization problem is well-posed in the sense of Assumption 2.3;
in particular, the effective risk aversion should be positive.
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corporate compensation, are in fact implicitly present in the hedge-fund industry, and
that the typical performance fees of 20% correspond to a power incentive with α = 0.8.
2.3. Counterexample. This section outlines a counterexample, which shows that The-
orem 2.4 can fail even in the usual Black-Scholes model if condition (2.3) is not satis-
fied, i.e., if the generic utility U is too risk averse compared to the reference isoelastic
utility U˜ at low wealth levels. The detailed calculations are presented in Section 6
below.
Suppose the safe asset earns a constant interest rate r > 0, and there is a single risky
asset following geometric Brownian motion:
dSt/St = (µ+ r)dt+ σdWt,
for a standard Brownian motion Wt and constants µ, σ > 0. Let U˜(x) = xp/p, p < 0
be a reference isoelastic utility with risk aversion 1 − p > 1 and consider the generic
utility function given by U(x) = xp/p for sufficiently large x and by U(x) = xp
∗
/p∗,
p∗ < p − 1, for x ≤ 1, with smooth interpolation in between. Then, at high wealth
levels, the generic utility U has the same risk aversion 1−p as its isoelastic counterpart
U˜ , but the corresponding risk aversion is bigger (by more than 1) at low wealth levels.
In particular, a simple calculation shows that the generic utility U does not satisfy (2.3).
In this setting, the optimal isoelastic portfolio X˜TT can be too risky for the generic
utility at low wealth levels, leading to a diminishing ratio of certainty equivalents com-
pared to the optimizer XTT for U in the long run:
(2.14) lim
T→∞
U−1(E[U(X˜TT )])
U−1(E[U(XTT )])
= 0.
Indeed, we show in Section 6 that this result holds when the risky asset is attractive
enough:
(2.15)
(
µ
σ2(1− p)
)2
> 2 max
{
1,
1
p− p∗ − 1
}
r
σ2
.
To understand this parameter restriction, recall that in this model µ/(σ2(1 − p)) is the
optimal portfolio weight in the risky asset for the isoelastic utility. Thus, the lower
bound (2.15) ensures that the risky asset is sufficiently attractive, compared to the safe
asset, to lead to a sufficiently large risky investment. In particular, as the difference
p − p∗ between risk aversions at low wealth levels declines to one, the isoelastic risky
weight rises, leading to a sufficiently large probability of reaching low wealth levels.
Indeed, the lower bound in (2.15) tends to infinity, as the difference in risk aversions
approaches one (p∗ ↑ p− 1), in line with our main result, which holds if this difference
is less than or equal to one.
The result in (2.14) may seem puzzling, because it implies that the properties of the
generic utility function at low wealths are important in the long run, even though the
safe asset has a positive growth rate, so that any initial safe investment grows arbitrarily,
thereby avoiding low wealth with certainty. However, the optimal isoelastic portfolio
keeps a constant fraction of wealth in the risky asset. Hence, if the stock price drops
and the risky position declines, the safe position is reduced as well, so that wealth can
decrease even further.13 Such a portfolio may be unacceptable for another investor, who
is substantially more risk averse at low wealth levels.
13As an extreme case, recall that, if risk aversion is small enough, the wealth of the optimal Merton
portfolio converges to zero almost surely, even though its expected return is high.
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3. NOTATION AND PRELIMINARIES
We begin by recalling the basic notions and duality results for the present non-
smooth setting, which have been established by Bouchard et al. (2004).
Recall the value functions uT and u˜T for the generic utility U and its isoelastic
counterpart U˜ from (2.4). Let
V (y) := sup
x>0
(U(x)− xy) and V˜ (y) := sup
x>0
(U˜(x)− xy)
be the dual functions of the generic utility U and the isoelastic utility U˜ , respectively.
Define the domain of V as dom(V ) := {y > 0 : |V (y)| < ∞} and let dom(V ) be its
closure. Consider the dual problems associated to (2.4):
(3.1) vT (y) = inf
Y ∈Y
E[V (yYT )] and v˜T (y) = inf
Y ∈Y
E[V˜ (yYT )],
where Y denotes the set of stochastic discount factors:
Y := {Y = Y /S0 : Y > 0 with Y 0 = 1 such that XY is a supermartingale
for all X ∈ X}.
THEOREM 3.1 (Bouchard-Touzi-Zeghal) Suppose the following holds:
a) U : (0,∞)→ R is nonconstant, nondecreasing and concave;
b) dom(V ) = [0,∞);
c) V satisfies the dual asymptotic elasticity condition
AE0(V ) := lim sup
y↓0
sup
x∈−∂V (y)
yx
V (y)
<∞;
d) There is y > 0 such that vT (y) defined in (3.1) is finite.
Then, optimal solutions XT ∈ X for uT and Y T ∈ Y for vT exist such that XTY T is
a uniformly integrable martingale and
(3.2) XTT ∈ −∂V (yTY TT ) for some yT > 0.
For isoelastic utilities U˜ , the same statements hold (cf. Kramkov and Schachermayer
(1999)). We denote the corresponding optimal solutions of u˜T and v˜T by X˜T and
Y˜ T , respectively. Both of them are unique. Moreover, since V˜ is differentiable, (3.2)
simplifies to X˜TT = −V˜ ′(y˜T Y˜ TT ) for some y˜T > 0.
Remark 3.2. If the generic utility U is differentiable and strictly concave, the aforemen-
tioned duality results also hold for a nondeterministic safe asset S0, assuming that the
latter bounded from above and below by two deterministic, positive processes S and S
(cf. (Karatzas and Žitkovic´, 2003, Theorem 3.10)).
In what follows, we will verify all prerequisites of Theorem 3.1 in our setting. We
begin by deriving some consequences of the convergence (2.2) of the ratio of marginal
utilities.
LEMMA 3.3 Suppose (2.2) holds and let p 6= 0. Then, for large wealth levels, the
generic utility U lies between arbitrarily close multiples of its isoelastic counterpart U˜
up to an additive constant. That is, for any  > 0 there exists some sufficiently large
M > 0 such that:
i) If p ∈ (0, 1), then for some constants A and B,
(3.3) (1− )xp/p+B ≤ U(x) ≤ (1 + )xp/p+A, for x ≥M;
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ii) If p < 0, then
(3.4) (1− )xp/p ≥ U(x) ≥ (1 + )xp/p, for x ≥M.
Moreover, U is regularly varying at infinity in both cases.
Proof. For any  ∈ (0, 1), the convergence (2.2) of the ratio of marginal utilities yields
the existence of some sufficiently large M such that
(3.5) (1− )xp−1 ≤ U ′(x) ≤ (1 + )xp−1, for x ≥M.
Up to a largerM, we can assume that the generic utility U is differentiable for x ≥M.
When p ∈ (0, 1), integrating (3.5) on (M, x) for x ≥ M gives the estimates in
i). When p < 0, integrating (3.5) on (x,∞) for x ≥ M and using U(∞) = 0 in
Assumption 2.2 iii) c) yields the estimates in ii). As for the regular variation of U , the
bounds in i) give
lim sup
x↑∞
U(cx)
U(x)
≤ lim sup
x↑∞
(1 + )(cx)p/p+A
(1− )xp/p+B =
1 + 
1−  c
p, for any c > 0.
Since  was chosen arbitrarily, it follows that lim supx→∞ U(cx)/U(x) ≤ cp. The
converse statement lim infx→∞ U(cx)/U(x) ≥ cp is obtained analogously. Hence, U
is regularly varying at infinity. The regular variation of U for the case p < 0 is obtained
along the same lines. 
Since U is differentiable and strictly concave at sufficiently large wealth levels (cf.
Assumption 2.2 i)), the subdifferential −∂V (y) is single-valued and equals (U ′)−1(y)
when y ∈ (0, y0) for some sufficiently small y0 > 0. Set
I(y) := −∂V (y) = (U ′)−1(y), for y ∈ (0, y0).
LEMMA 3.4 Suppose (2.2) holds. Then:
(3.6) lim
y↓0
I(y)y
1
1−p = 1.
Proof. Set x = I(y), which tends to infinity as y ↓ 0. Then, (3.6) follows from
I(y)
y
1
p−1
=
I(U ′(x))
(U ′(x))
1
p−1
=
x
(U ′(x))
1
p−1
=
(
xp−1
U ′(x)
) 1
p−1
→ 1, as y ↓ 0,
where the convergence holds due to (2.2). 
Let us now verify the prerequisites of Theorem 3.1.
LEMMA 3.5 Let Assumption 2.2 hold. Then dom(V ) = [0,∞).
Proof. We prove the statement for the case p < 0; the proofs for 0 < p < 1 and p = 0
are similar. Since U is increasing with limx↑∞ U(x) = 0, we have U(x)− xy ≤ 0 for
any x, y > 0. Therefore, V (y) ≤ 0 for any y > 0. To obtain a lower bound for V ,
recall the second inequality in (3.4), which gives a lower bound for U for x ≥M. For
the same M, (2.3) implies the existence of CM < 0 such that U(x) ≥ CMxp−1 for
x < M. Hence, when y is small, V (y) is bounded from below by the convex dual of
(1 + )xp/p, which is −(1 + ) 11−p p−1p y
p
p−1 ; when y is large, V (y) is bounded from
below by the convex dual of CMxp−1, which is −p−1p−2 ((p − 1)CM )−
1
p−2 y
p−1
p−2 . Both
convex dual functions are larger than negative infinity when y ∈ (0,∞). Therefore,
V (y) > −∞ for y ∈ (0,∞) confirming that dom(V ) = (0,∞). 
LEMMA 3.6 The convex dual V of the generic utility U satisfies the dual asymptotic
elasticity condition.
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Proof. Since −∂V (y) = I(y) for sufficiently small y, the statement is equivalent to
lim supy↓0
yI(y)
V (y) <∞. For any  > 0, (3.6) yields (1− )y
1
p−1 ≤ I(y) ≤ (1 + )y 1p−1
for sufficiently small y, say y ≤ y for some y. Integrating the first inequality on (y, y)
yields V (y) ≥ (1−)V˜ (y)+D, for y ≤ y and someD. Then, lim supy↓0 yI(y)V (y) <∞
follows from this lower bound for V (y) and the upper bound for I(y). 
LEMMA 3.7 The value functions uT , u˜T in (2.4), and vT , v˜T in (3.1) are finite.
Proof. If p < 0, (3.6) yields I(y) ≤ (1 + )y 1p−1 for y ≤ y. Integrating this inequality
on (y, y) yields V (y) ≤ (1 + )V˜ (y) + D˜, y ≤ y, for some D˜. Since V˜ (y) < 0
and V (y) is decreasing, this upper bound implies that V (y) is uniformly bounded from
above on (0,∞), so that vT (y) <∞ for any y > 0. On the other hand, it follows from
U˜(x) ≤ 0 and the first inequality in (3.4) that U(x) is uniformly bounded from above.
Hence, uT < ∞ for any T > 0 as well. When 0 ≤ p < 1, the same argument as in
the case p < 0 gives V (y) ≤ (1 + )V˜ (y) + D˜, y ≤ y, for some D˜. Since V (y) is
decreasing, V (y) is also bounded from above for y ≥ y. Combining this upper bound
for V (y) with Assumption 2.3 gives vT (y) <∞, for any T > 0 and y > 0. Hence uT
is also finite, due to the duality relation uT ≤ infy>0(vT (y) + y). 
The previous three lemmata verify all assumptions in Theorem 3.1, hence the state-
ments therein hold. For the isoelastic problem u˜T , we recall from (Guasoni and Robert-
son, 2012, Lemma 5) the following duality result, which will be frequently used below.
LEMMA 3.8 LetX,Y be FT -measurable random variables such thatX,Y > 0 almost
surely and E[XY ] ≤ 1. Then, for any 0 6= p < 1,
1
p
E[Xp] ≤ 1
p
E[Y q]1−p, for q =
p
p− 1 ,
and equality holds if and only if E[XY ] = 1 and Xp−1 = αY for some α > 0.
Finally, we note that limT→∞ S0T = ∞ in Assumption 2.1 implies the following
long-run property for stochastic discount factors:
(3.7) lim
T→∞
sup
Y ∈Y
E[YT ] = 0.
Indeed, a full safe investment is admissible, so that the supermartingale property of
S0Y yields S00 ≥ S0TE[YT ] for any Y ∈ Y . Assertion (3.7) in turn follows from
Assumption 2.1.
4. PROOF OF THE MAIN RESULT FOR p 6= 0
Different arguments are needed to establish the main result in the cases where the
corresponding isoelastic utilities are of power type (p 6= 0) or logarithmic (p = 0),
respectively.
First, consider the case p 6= 0. Recall from Lemma 3.3 that the generic utility U is
regularly varying at infinity. As a result, the convergence (2.6) of the ratio of certainty
equivalents follows from the convergence of the ratio of the respective utilities:
LEMMA 4.1 Let Assumptions 2.1 - 2.3 hold. Then (2.6) holds provided that
(4.1) lim
T→∞
E[U(XTT )]
E[U(X˜TT )]
= 1.
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Proof. To simplify notation, define aT = U−1(E[U(XTT )]) as well as bT =
U−1(E[U(X˜TT )]), and note that aT , bT ≥ 0 and aT ≥ bT .
Observe that limT→∞ aT = limT→∞ bT = ∞. Indeed, for p ∈ (0, 1),
limT→∞ E[U(XTT )] ≥ limT→∞ E[U(S0T )] = ∞ follows from limx↑∞ U(x) = ∞
(cf. the first inequality in (3.3)) and Assumption 2.1. In view of (4.1), we also have
limT→∞ E[U(X˜TT )] = ∞. As U−1(∞) = ∞, this confirms that limT→∞ aT =
limT→∞ bT = ∞. When p < 0, the argument is analogous, with the difference that
U(∞) = 0, whence both expected utilities converge to zero, and therefore certainty
equivalents are also become infinite.
Now, prove (2.6) by contradiction. Suppose that, for any  > 0, there exists a
subsequence {Tn}n≥0 with limn→∞ Tn = ∞ such that aTn/bTn ≥ 1 + . For p ∈
(0, 1), the regular variation of U at infinity implies that
lim inf
Tn→∞
U(aTn)
U(bTn)
≥ lim inf
Tn→∞
U((1 + )bTn)
U(bTn)
= (1 + )p > 1.
For p < 0, the inequality U(bTn) < 0 and the regular variation of U at infinity imply
that
lim sup
Tn→∞
U(aTn)
U(bTn)
≤ lim sup
Tn→∞
U((1 + )bTn)
U(bTn)
= (1 + )p < 1,
and both inequalities above contradict (4.1). 
To prove Theorem 2.4, it therefore remains to show the following:
PROPOSITION 4.2 Let Assumptions 2.1 - 2.3 hold. Then
(4.2) lim
T→∞
E[U(XTT )]
E[U(X˜TT )]
= 1.
In order to compare the utilities E[U(XTT )] and E[U(X˜TT )] as T → ∞, compare
both of them to the maximal isoelastic utilities E[(X˜TT )p/p]. Henceforth, we prove
Proposition 4.2 separately for 0 < p < 1 and p < 0, since the contribution of low
wealth levels requires a different treatment in each case.
4.1. Proof of Proposition 4.2 for 0 < p < 1. We first focus on the long-run perfor-
mance of the isoelastic portfolio X˜TT .
LEMMA 4.3 Let Assumptions 2.1 - 2.3 hold. Then:
lim
T→∞
E[U(X˜TT )]
E[(X˜TT )p/p]
= 1.
Proof. To simplify notation, the superscript T in X˜TT is omitted throughout this proof.
By (3.3),
E
[
U(X˜T ) I{X˜T<M}
]
E[X˜pT /p]
+B
P(X˜T ≥M)
E[X˜pT /p]
+ (1− )
E
[
(X˜T )
p I{X˜T≥M}
]
E[X˜pT ]
≤ E[U(X˜T )]
E[X˜pT /p]
≤
E
[
U(X˜T ) I{X˜T<M}
]
E[X˜pT /p]
+A
P(X˜T ≥M)
E[X˜pT /p]
+ (1 + )
E
[
(X˜T )
p I{X˜T≥M}
]
E[X˜pT ]
.
(4.3)
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Note that U(X˜T ) is uniformly bounded from below because this is assumed for
the generic utility U , cf. Assumption 2.2 iii)-a). As limT→∞ E[X˜pT /p] ≥
limT→∞ E[(S0T )p/p] = ∞ by Assumption 2.1, this implies that the first two terms
on both sides of (4.3) converge to zero as T →∞.
Now, focus on the third terms. Define an auxiliary probability measure PT on FT
via
(4.4)
dPT
dP
=
X˜pT
E[X˜pT ]
,
where the expectation is finite by Lemma 3.7. Recall from Section 3 that y˜T Y˜ TT =
X˜p−1T and, moreover, 1 = E[Y˜ TT X˜T ] ≥ E[Y˜ TT XT ] and hence
(4.5)
0 ≥ E
[
y˜T Y˜ TT (XT − X˜T )
]
= E
[
X˜p−1T (XT − X˜T )
]
= E
[
X˜pT
]
EP
T
[
XT
X˜T
− 1
]
,
for any admissible wealth process X . This inequality yields that
(4.6) lim
T→∞
PT (X˜T ≥ N) = 1, for any N > 0.
Indeed, choosing XT = S0T in (4.5), it follows that
1 ≥ EPT [S0T /X˜T ] ≥ EP
T
[
S0T /X˜T I{S0T≥L,X˜T≤N}
]
≥ L
N
PT (S0T ≥ L, X˜T ≤ N),
for any positive L and N . Combined with Assumption 2.1, this yields
lim sup
T→∞
PT (X˜T ≤ N) ≤ lim sup
T→∞
PT (S0T ≥ L, X˜T ≤ N) + lim sup
T→∞
PT (S0T < L)
≤ N/L,
which confirms (4.6) because L was arbitrary.
Now, coming back to the third term of the upper and lower bounds in (4.3),
E
[
(X˜T )
p I{X˜T≥M}
]
E[X˜pT ]
= PT (X˜T ≥M)→ 1, as T →∞,
where the convergence follows from (4.6). Therefore, the above estimates on both sides
of (4.3) yield
1−  ≤ lim inf
T→∞
E[U(X˜T )]
E[X˜pT ]
≤ lim sup
T→∞
E[U(X˜T )]
E[X˜pT ]
≤ 1 + .
This proves the assertion because  was chosen arbitrarily. 
The proof of Proposition 4.2 (and hence the main result) now proceeds as follows.
The lower bound in (3.3) yields
E[U(X˜TT )I{X˜TT ≥M}] ≥ (1− )E[(X˜
T
T )
p/p I{X˜TT ≥M}] +BP(X˜
T
T ≥M),
which converges to ∞ as T → ∞, because limT→∞ E[(X˜TT )p/p] ≥
limT→∞ E[(S0T )p/p] = ∞ follows from Assumption 2.1. Therefore, given that U
is bounded from below, limT→∞ E[U(X˜TT )] = ∞. On the other hand, the optimality
of XTT for the generic utility U yields E[U(X˜TT )] ≤ E[U(XTT )], so that
lim inf
T→∞
E[U(XTT )]
E[U(X˜TT )]
≥ 1.
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Therefore, Proposition 4.2 follows by showing
lim sup
T→∞
E[U(XTT )]
E[U(X˜TT )]
≤ 1.
In view of Lemma 4.3, it suffices to prove that
lim sup
T→∞
E[U(XTT )]
E[(X˜TT )p/p]
≤ 1.
To establish this inequality, we begin with the following auxiliary result:
LEMMA 4.4 Suppose Assumptions 2.1 - 2.3 hold and let p ∈ (0, 1). Then:
1 = lim
T→∞
E[(Y TT )q]1−p
E[(Y˜ TT )q]1−p
= lim
T→∞
yT
y˜T
.
Proof. To simplify notation, we omit the superscript T in XT , X˜T , Y T , and Y˜ T
throughout this proof. For the M in (3.5), the martingale property of XY implies
1 = E[XTYT ] =
1
yT
E
[
U ′(XT )XT I{XT≥M}
]
+ E[XTYT I{XT<M}]
≤ 1 + 
yT
E
[
Xp−1T XT I{XT≥M}
]
+ E[XTYT I{XT<M}].
(4.7)
Here, the second identity uses the first-order condition U ′(XT ) = yTYT when XT ≥
M, and the inequality follows from the second inequality in (3.5). The second term on
the right-hand side of (4.7) vanishes as T → ∞ due to (3.7). For the first term, note
that E[XT YˆT ] ≤ 1 for any Yˆ ∈ Y . Hence, it follows from Lemma 3.8 that
(4.8)
1
p
E[XpT ] ≤
1
p
E[Yˆ qT ]
1−p, for q =
p
p− 1 .
The previous inequality and p > 0 imply that
lim inf
T→∞
E
[
XpT I{XT≥M}
] ≤ lim inf
T→∞
E [XpT ] ≤ lim inf
T→∞
E[Yˆ qT ]
1−p, for any Yˆ ∈ Y.
Coming back to (4.7), the above estimates for the two terms on the right-hand side yield
(4.9)
1
1 + 
≤ lim inf
T→∞
1
yT
E[Yˆ qT ]
1−p, for any Yˆ ∈ Y.
For any  > 0, (3.6) shows that there exists a sufficiently small δ < y0, so that
(4.10) (1− ) y 1p−1 ≤ I(y) ≤ (1 + ) y 1p−1 , for y < δ.
Fix such a δ; the martingale property of XY then implies
(4.11) 1 = E[XTYT ] = E
[
YT I(y
TYT ) I{yTYT≤δ}
]
+ E
[
YTXT I{yTYT>δ}
]
,
where the second identity follows from XT = I(yTYT ) for yTYT ≤ δ. Continue
by estimating the second term on the right-hand side. Let V ′− be the increasing left
derivative of the convex function V . Then −V ′−(y) dominates all other elements of the
subdifferential −∂V at y, i.e., −V ′−(y) ≥ x for any x ∈ −∂V (y). Moreover, again
since−V ′− is nonincreasing, there exists Cδ such that x ≤ Cδ for any x ∈ −∂V (y) and
y > δ. In view of (3.2), it therefore follows that XT ≤ Cδ when yTYT > δ. As a
result, (3.7) gives
E
[
YTXT I{yTYT>δ}
] ≤ CδE [YT I{yTYT>δ}]→ 0, as T →∞.
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Turning to the first term on the right-hand side of (4.11), it follows from the first in-
equality in (4.10) that
E
[
YT I(y
TYT ) I{yTYT≤δ}
]
≥ (1− )E[Y
q
T I{yTYT≤δ}]
(yT )1/(1−p)
=
1− 
(yT )1/(1−p)
E[Y qT ]−
1− 
(yT )1/(1−p)
E[Y qT I{yTYT>δ}].
(4.12)
Here, the second term tends to zero as the horizon grows because
1
(yT )1/(1−p)
E[Y qT I{yTYT>δ}] = E[YT (y
TYT )
1
p−1 I{yTYT>δ}] ≤ δ
1
p−1
 E[YT ]→ 0,
due to (3.7). These estimates together with (4.11) and (4.12) imply that
1
1−  ≥ lim supT→∞
1
(yT )1/(1−p)
E[Y qT ].
Raising both sides to the power (1 − p), and using the optimality of Y˜ for the dual
problem v˜T in (3.1), we obtain(
1
1− 
)1−p
≥ lim sup
T→∞
1
yT
E[Y qT ]
1−p ≥ lim sup
T→∞
1
yT
E[Y˜ qT ]
1−p.
Together with (4.9), and recalling that  was chosen arbitrarily, it follows that
1 = lim
T→∞
1
yT
E[Y qT ]
1−p = lim
T→∞
1
yT
E[Y˜ qT ]
1−p.
Together with E[Y˜ qT ]1−p = E[X˜
p
T ] = y˜
T (cf. Lemma 3.8) this yields the assertion. 
We are now ready to complete the proof for Proposition 4.2, and hence the main
Theorem 2.4, for the case 0 < p < 1.
Proof of Proposition 4.2 for 0 < p < 1. We continue to omit the superscript T to ease
notation. As discussed before Lemma 4.4, it suffices to show
(4.13) lim sup
T→∞
E[U(XT )]
E[X˜pT /p]
≤ 1.
The second inequality in (3.3) implies
E[U(XT )]
E[X˜pT /p]
=
E[U(XT ) I{XT<M}]
E[X˜pT /p]
+
E[U(XT ) I{XT≥M}]
E[X˜pT /p]
≤ E
[
U(XT ) I{XT<M}
]
E[X˜pT /p]
+A
P(XT ≥M)
E[X˜pT /p]
+ (1 + )
E
[
XpT I{XT≥M}
]
E[X˜pT ]
≤ E
[
U(XT ) I{XT<M}
]
E[X˜pT /p]
+A
P(XT ≥M)
E[X˜pT /p]
+ (1 + )
E [XpT ]
E[X˜pT ]
.
(4.14)
As we have seen in the proof of Lemma 4.3, the first two terms on the right-hand side
vanish as T →∞. For the third, Lemma 3.8 implies (1/p)E[XpT ] ≤ (1/p)E[Y qT ]1−p so
that lim supT→∞ E[X
p
T ] ≤ lim supT→∞ E[Y qT ]1−p for q = p/(p − 1) because p > 0.
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On the other hand, E[X˜pT ] = E[Y˜
q
T ]
1−p (again cf. Lemma 3.8). Therefore the previous
estimates together with (4.14) imply
lim sup
T→∞
E[U(XT )]
E[X˜pT /p]
≤ (1 + ) lim sup
T→∞
E[Y qT ]1−p
E[Y˜ qT ]1−p
= 1 + ,
where the last identity follows from Lemma 4.4. Hence, Assertion (4.13) is confirmed
because  was chosen arbitrarily. 
4.2. Proof of Proposition 4.2 for p < 0. The overall strategy is similar to the case
0 < p < 1. However, the contribution of low wealth levels to the total expected utility
is more delicate, as utilities may be unbounded from below near zero and the value
functions uT and u˜T converge to zero rather than infinity as T → ∞.14 Therefore, the
additional Assumptions (2.3) on U are needed to ensure that the contribution of low
wealth levels is still negligible in the long run. We start with the following analogue of
Lemma 4.3.
LEMMA 4.5 Let Assumptions 2.1 and 2.2 hold. Then:
lim
T→∞
E[U(X˜TT )]
E[(X˜TT )p/p]
= 1.
Proof. To simplify notation, the superscript T in X˜T and Y˜ T is omitted throughout this
proof. In view of (3.4), we have
E
[
U(X˜T ) I{X˜T<M}
]
E[X˜pT /p]
+ (1− )
E
[
X˜pT I{X˜T≥M}
]
E[X˜pT ]
≤ E[U(X˜T )]
E[X˜pT /p]
≤
E
[
U(X˜T ) I{X˜T<M}
]
E[X˜pT /p]
+ (1 + )
E
[
X˜pT I{X˜T≥M}
]
E[X˜pT ]
.
(4.15)
Let us estimate separately the two terms in the upper and lower bounds. For the second
term, similar arguments as in the proof of Lemma 4.3, utilizing the auxiliary measure
PT , yield
(4.16) lim
T→∞
E
[
X˜pT I{X˜T≥M}
]
E[X˜pT ]
= 1.
Compared to the proof of Lemma 4.3, the case p < 0 differs with respect to the
estimation of the first term in the upper and lower bounds in (4.15). Here, the first-order
condition X˜p−1T = y˜
T Y˜T and the martingale property of Y˜ X˜ imply E[X˜pT ] = y˜T . On
the other hand, it follows from (2.3) that pU(x) ≤ CMxp−1 for some constant CM > 0
14This is because 0 ≥ uT ≥ E[U(S0T )] and limT→∞ E[U(S0T )] = 0 due to limT→∞ S0T = ∞ and
limx↑∞ U(x) = 0. The same statement holds for the isoelastic utility U˜ .
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and any x < M. As a result:
E[U(X˜T ) I{X˜T<M}]
E[X˜pT /p]
=
E[pU(X˜T ) I{X˜T<M}]
y˜T
≤ CM
E[X˜p−1T I{X˜T<M}]
y˜T
= CME[Y˜ TT I{X˜T<M}]→ 0, as T →∞.
(4.17)
Therefore, the first terms of the upper and lower bounds in (4.15) vanish as the horizon
grows. Together with (4.15) and (4.16), it follows that
1−  ≤ lim inf
T→∞
E[U(X˜T )]
E[X˜pT /p]
≤ lim sup
T→∞
E[U(X˜T )]
E[X˜pT /p]
≤ 1 + .
This yields the assertion because ε was arbitrary. 
Remark 4.6. The calculation of the contribution from low wealth levels relative to the
expected power utility in (4.17) will be used in the counterexample in Section 6. There-
fore, for future reference, we summarize it here: for any M and U satisfying (2.3),
lim
T→∞
E[U(X˜TT ) I{X˜TT <M}]
E[(X˜TT )p/p]
= 0.
A careful examination of (4.17) shows that U does not need to be concave to ensure the
above convergence.
Similarly as in the case 0 < p < 1, the proof of Proposition 4.2 (and hence the
main result) now proceeds as follows. The optimality of XTT for the utility U yields
E[U(X˜TT )] ≤ E[U(XTT )] < 0, so that
E[U(XTT )]
E[U(X˜TT )]
≤ 1, for any T > 0.
Therefore, Proposition 4.2 follows by showing
lim inf
T→∞
E[U(XTT )]
E[U(X˜TT )]
≥ 1.
Due to Lemma 4.5, it suffices to prove
lim inf
T→∞
E[U(XTT )]
E[(X˜TT )p/p]
≥ 1,
which will be established in the sequel. The following auxiliary result is the analogue
of Lemma 4.4:
LEMMA 4.7 Suppose Assumptions 2.1 and 2.2 hold for p < 0. Then, even without
assuming (2.3):
1 = lim
T→∞
E[(Y TT )q]1−p
E[(Y˜ TT )q]1−p
= lim
T→∞
yT
y˜T
.
Proof. To simplify notation, we once more omit the superscript T inXT , X˜T , Y T , and
Y˜ T throughout this proof. Coming back to (4.11) and using the second inequality in
20 PAOLO GUASONI, JOHANNES MUHLE-KARBE, AND HAO XING
Equation (4.10),
1 ≤ (1 + )E[Y
q
T I{yTYT≤δ}]
(yT )1/(1−p)
+ E
[
YTXT I{yTYT>δ}
]
≤ (1 + ) E[Y
q
T ]
(yT )1/(1−p)
+ E
[
YTXT I{yTYT>δ}
]
,
(4.18)
where q = p/(p− 1). Now, repeating the argument after (4.11), the second term on the
right-hand side vanishes as T → ∞. Then, raise both sides of (4.18) to the (1 − p)-th
power, obtaining
(4.19)
(
1
1 + 
)1−p
≤ lim inf
T→∞
1
yT
E[Y qT ]
1−p ≤ lim inf
T→∞
1
yT
E[Y˜ qT ]
1−p,
where the second inequality follows from the optimality of Y˜ for the dual problem v˜T
in (3.1).
On the other hand, for any fixed a > 0, it follows from (2.2) that
(4.20) lim
x↑∞
U ′(x)
(x+ a)p−1
= 1.
Hence, for any  > 0, there is M,a > 0 such that U ′(x) exists and
(4.21) (1− )(x+ a)p−1 ≤ U ′(x) ≤ (1 + )(x+ a)p−1, for x ≥M,a.
The martingale property of XY , the first-order condition yTYT = U ′(XT ) for large
XT , and the first inequality in (4.21) in turn yield
1 = E[XTYT ]
= E
[
XTYT I{XT<M,a}
]− a
yT
E
[
U ′(XT ) I{XT≥M,a}
]
+
1
yT
E
[
U ′(XT )(XT + a) I{XT≥M,a}
]
≥ E [XTYT I{XT<M,a}]− aE [YT I{XT≥M,a}]
+ (1− ) 1
yT
E
[
(XT + a)
p I{XT≥M,a}
]
.
By (3.7), the first two terms on the right-hand side go to zero as T →∞. Therefore
1
1−  ≥ lim supT→∞
1
yT
E[(XT + a)p I{XT≥M,a}]
≥ lim sup
T→∞
1
yT
E[(XT + a)p]− lim sup
T→∞
1
yT
E[(XT + a)p I{XT<M,a}].
(4.22)
Let us estimate the second term on the right-hand side below. To this end, p < 0 and
XT ≥ 0 imply that
1
yT
E[(XT + a)p I{XT<M,a}] ≤
ap
yT
E[I{XT<M,a}]
≤ a
p
yT
E
[
yTYT
δM
I{XT<M,a}
]
=
ap
δM
E[YT I{XT<M,a}]→ 0, as T →∞,
(4.23)
where the last step is once again a consequence of (3.7). Here, δM is a positive constant
such that yTYT ≥ δM on {XT < M,a}. The reason for the existence of such a
constant is the following. Notice that XT ∈ −∂V (yTYT ) and that every element x of
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−∂V (y) dominates −V ′+(y), where V ′+(y) is the right derivative of V at y. Since V (y)
is strictly convex when y is close to zero, −V ′+ is strictly decreasing. Together with
−V ′+(0) = ∞, this implies the existence of δM > 0 such that −V ′+(y) ≥ M,a for
y < δM , and in turn yTYT ≥ δM on {XT < M,a}.
In view of (4.23), the second term on the right-hand side of (4.22) vanishes as the
horizon grows, so that
1
1−  ≥ lim supT→∞
1
yT
E[(XT + a)p].
Now, note that E
[
(XT + a)
YˆT
aE[YˆT ]+1
]
≤ 1 for any Yˆ ∈ Y . Hence, Lemma 3.8 shows
(4.24)
1
p
E[(XT + a)p] ≤ 1
p
E[Yˆ qT ]1−p
(aE[YˆT ] + 1)−p
, for q =
p
p− 1 .
Taking into account that limT→∞ E[YˆT ] = 0 and p < 0, the previous two inequalities
imply
(4.25)
1
1−  ≥ lim supT→∞
1
yT
E[(XT + a)p] ≥ lim sup
T→∞
1
yT
E[Yˆ qT ]
1−p, for any Yˆ ∈ Y.
In particular, this holds for YT and Y˜T . Combining this inequality with (4.19) and
recalling that  was chosen arbitrarily, it follows that
1 = lim
T→∞
1
yT
E[Y qT ]
1−p = lim
T→∞
1
yT
E[Y˜ qT ]
1−p.
Together with E[Y˜ qT ]1−p = E[X˜
p
T ] = y˜
T (cf. Lemma 3.8), this yields the assertion. 
We are now ready to complete the proof of Proposition 4.2 and hence Theorem 2.4
in the case p < 0.
Proof of Proposition 4.2 for p < 0. As discussed before Lemma 4.7, it suffices to show
that
(4.26) lim inf
T→∞
E[U(XT )]
E[X˜pT /p]
≥ 1.
Fix a > 0. Recall that limx↑∞ U ′(x)/(x+ a)p−1 = 1 by (4.20). As in (3.4), it follows
that
(4.27) (1− )(x+ a)p/p ≥ U(x) ≥ (1 + )(x+ a)p/p, for x ≥M,a.
Hence,
E[U(XT )]
E[X˜pT /p]
=
E[U(XT ) I{XT<M,a}]
E[X˜pT /p]
+
E[U(XT ) I{XT≥M,a}]
E[X˜pT /p]
≥ (1− )E[(XT + a)
pI{XT≥M,a}]
E[X˜pT ]
= (1− )E[(XT + a)
p]
E[X˜pT ]
− (1− )E[(XT + a)
pI{XT<M,a}]
E[X˜pT ]
,
where the first inequality in (4.27), multiplying by p < 0 on both sides, is used to obtain
the inequality. We have seen in (4.23) that
lim
T→∞
1
yT
E[(XT + a)pI{XT<M,a}] = 0.
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Since E[X˜pT ] = y˜T and limT→∞ yT /y˜T = 1 by Lemma 4.7, it follows that
lim
T→∞
E[(XT + a)pI{XT<M,a}]
E[X˜pT ]
= 0,
and in turn
(4.28) lim inf
T→∞
E[U(XT )]
E[X˜pT /p]
≥ (1− ) lim inf
T→∞
E[(XT + a)p]
E[X˜pT ]
.
Now take Yˆ in (4.24) to be Y . Then, since limT→∞ E[YT ] = 0, and E[X˜pT ] =
E[Y˜ qT ]1−p by another application of Lemma 3.8, it follows from (4.28) and Lemma 4.7
that
lim inf
T→∞
E[U(XT )]
E[X˜pT /p]
≥ (1−) lim inf
T→∞
E[(XT + a)p]
E[X˜pT ]
≥ (1−) lim inf
T→∞
E[Y qT ]1−p
E[Y˜ qT ]1−p
= 1−.
Since  was arbitrary, this proves (4.26) and in turn Proposition 4.2. 
5. PROOF OF THE MAIN RESULT FOR p = 0
If p = 0, the isoelastic utility U˜ is logarithmic and – compared to the power case
p 6= 0 – different arguments are needed to establish the main result. In this case, the
convergence (2.2) of the ratio of marginal utilities implies the following:
LEMMA 5.1 Suppose (2.2) holds. Then, for any  > 0, there exists a sufficiently large
M such that
(1− )(a− b) ≤ log U
−1(a)
U−1(b)
≤ (1 + )(a− b), for a ≥ b ≥M.
Proof. For any  ∈ (0, 1), the same argument as in Item i) of Lemma 3.3 yields the
existence of M such that
(5.1) (1− ) log x+B ≤ U(x) ≤ (1 + ) log x+A, for x ≥M
and constants A, B. The lower bound implies limx↑∞ U(x) = ∞. Set y = U(x);
then, x ↑ ∞ as y ↑ ∞. Combined with the convergence of ratio of marginal utilities
(2.2), this yields
(U−1)′(y)
U−1(y)
=
1
xU ′(x)
→ 1, as y ↑ ∞.
Therefore, 1−  ≤ (logU−1(y))′ ≤ 1 +  for y ≥M, after enlarging M if necessary.
The assertion then follows from integrating these inequalities over the interval (b, a) for
a ≥ b ≥M. 
In the long run, the generic expected utility diverges, both for the corresponding
optimal portfolio and for its isoelastic counterpart:
LEMMA 5.2 Let Assumptions 2.1 - 2.3 hold. Then
lim
T→∞
E[U(XTT )] = lim
T→∞
E[U(X˜TT )] =∞.
Proof. Once again, the superscript T for XT , X˜T , and Y˜ T is omitted throughout this
proof. Since E[U(XT )] ≥ E[U(X˜T )] by optimality of XT for the generic utility U , the
first convergence is implied by the second one. To prove the second convergence, first
note that the lower bound in (5.1) yields
E[U(X˜T ) I{X˜T≥M}] ≥ (1− )E[log(X˜T ) I{X˜T≥M}] +BP(X˜T ≥M)
→∞, as T →∞.(5.2)
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Here, the last convergence holds because the optimality of X˜T for the logarithmic utility
implies limT→∞ E[log(X˜T )] ≥ limT→∞ E[log(S0T )] = ∞ by limT→∞ S0T = ∞.
Now, turn to the contribution of the low wealth levels {X˜T < M}. To this end,
Assumption (2.3) guarantees the existence of CM such that U(x) ≥ CMx−1 for all
x < M. Then,
E[U(X˜T ) I{X˜T<M}] ≥ CM E[(X˜T )−1 I{X˜T<M}].
Recall from Section 3 that X˜−1T = y˜
T Y˜T and y˜T ≡ 1.15 In view of (3.7),
the term on the right-hand side therefore converges to zero as T → ∞, so that
lim infT→∞[U(X˜T ) I{X˜T<M}] ≥ 0. Combined with (5.2), this confirms the second
(and in turn the first) convergence in the assertion. 
Set aT = E[U(XTT )] and bT = E[U(X˜TT )]. As we have seen above, aT ≥ bT
and both utilities tend to infinity as T → ∞. In view of Lemma 5.1, the convergence
U−1(aT )/U−1(bT ) → 1 of the ratio of corresponding certainty equivalents is thereby
equivalent to the difference aT − bT of utilities vanishing in the long run. This is
in contrast to the power case p 6= 0, where the convergence of the ratio of certainty
equivalents was found to be equivalent to the convergence of the ratio aT /bT of utilities
in Lemma 4.1. As a result, different estimates are needed in the case p = 0. More
specifically, the proof of the main result is based on the following long-run asymptotics
in this case, whose technical proof is deferred to Section 5.1.
PROPOSITION 5.3 Let p = 0 and suppose Assumptions 2.1 - 2.3 hold. Then:
i) P− limT→∞ X˜TT =∞;
ii) P− limT→∞XTT =∞;
iii) P− limT→∞XTT /X˜TT = 1.
Here, P− limT→∞ denotes convergence in P-probability.
With Proposition 5.3 at hand, we can now complete the proof of the main result also
in the case p = 0:
Proof of Theorem 2.4 for p = 0. The superscript T forXT , X˜T , and Y˜ T is again omit-
ted throughout this proof. As discussed above, due to Lemmas 5.1 and 5.2, it suffices
to prove
lim
T→∞
E[U(XT )− U(X˜T )] = 0.
Since E[U(XT )] ≥ E[U(X˜T )], we only need to show
(5.3) lim sup
T→∞
E[U(XT )− U(X˜T )] ≤ 0.
For any  > 0, the convergence (2.2) of the ratio of marginal utilities implies that there
exists a sufficiently large M such that xU ′(x) ≤ 1 +  for x ≥M. As a result:
U(x)− U(x˜) =
∫ x
x˜
1
y
yU ′(y) dy ≤ (1 + )(log x− log x˜), for x ≥ x˜ ≥M.
15The identity y˜T ≡ 1 follows from 1 = E[X˜T /X˜T ] = E[X˜T y˜T Y˜T ] = y˜T , where E[X˜T Y˜T ] = 1 is
used to obtain the third identity.
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Choosing x = XT and x˜ = X˜T in the previous inequality leads to
E
[(
U(XT )− U(X˜T )
)
I{X˜T≥M,XT≥M}
]
≤ E
[(
U(XT )− U(X˜T )
)
I{XT≥X˜T≥M}
]
≤ (1 + )E
[
log
XT
X˜T
I{XT≥X˜T≥M}
]
,
(5.4)
where the first inequality holds because U(XT ) < U(X˜T ) when XT < X˜T . Now,
observe that
0 ≤ E
[
log
XT
X˜T
I{XT>X˜T≥M}
]
≤ E
[
log
XT
X˜T
I{XT>X˜T }
]
= E
[
log
(
XT
X˜T
∨ 1
)]
,
and, moreover,
E
[
exp log
(
XT
X˜T
∨ 1
)]
= E
[
XT
X˜T
∨ 1
]
≤ E
[
XT
X˜T
]
+ 1 ≤ 2, for all T > 0,
where the last inequality holds due to the numeraire property of X˜T , that is,
E[XˆT /X˜T ] ≤ 1 for any admissible Xˆ (cf. (4.5) with p = 0). As a result, de la
Vallee-Poussin’s criterion as in (Shiryaev, 1996, Lemma 3) implies that the family
log
(
XT
X˜T
∨ 1
)
is uniformly integrable in T . Together with Proposition 5.3 iii), this
yields
(5.5) lim
T→∞
E
[
log
XT
X˜T
I{XT>X˜T≥M}
]
= 0.
In view of (5.4), it follows that
lim sup
T→∞
E
[(
U(XT )− U(X˜T )
)
I{X˜T≥M,XT≥M}
]
≤ 0.
In the next two paragraphs, we will show
lim sup
T→∞
E
[
U(XT ) I{XT≤M or X˜T≤M}
]
≤ 0,(5.6)
lim inf
T→∞
E
[
U(X˜T ) I{XT≤M or X˜T≤M}
]
≥ 0.(5.7)
Combining these three inequalities then yields (5.3), and in turn completes the proof of
Theorem 2.4 in the case p = 0.
To establish (5.6), note that Proposition 5.3 ii) gives
lim sup
T→∞
E
[
U(XT ) I{XT≤M}
] ≤ U(M) lim sup
T→∞
P(XT ≤M) = 0.
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On the other hand, the upper bound on the generic utility U in (5.1) implies
E[U(XT ) I{XT>M,X˜T≤M}]
≤ (1 + )E[log(XT ) I{XT>M,X˜T≤M}] +AP(X˜T ≤M)
≤ (1 + )E
[
log
XT
X˜T
I{XT>X˜T }
]
+ (1 + )E[log(X˜T ) I{X≥M,X˜T≤ M}]
+AP(X˜T ≤M)
≤ (1 + )E
[
log
XT
X˜T
I{XT>X˜T }
]
+ ((1 + ) logM +A)P(X˜T ≤M)
= (1 + )E
[
log
XT
X˜T
∨ 1
]
+ ((1 + ) logM +A)P(X˜T ≤M).
Now, Proposition 5.3 iii) and the uniform integrability established in the derivation
of (5.5) show that the first term on the right-hand side converges to zero as T → ∞.
Likewise, by Proposition 5.3 i), the second term also tends to zero as the horizon grows,
confirming (5.6).
To prove (5.7), note that
lim inf
T→∞
E[U(X˜T ) I{X˜T>M,XT≤M}] ≥ U(M) limT→∞P(X˜T > M, XT ≤M) = 0
by Proposition 5.3 ii). It therefore suffices to show
(5.8) lim inf
T→∞
E[U(X˜T ) I{X˜T≤M}] ≥ 0.
To this end, (2.3) yields the existence of CM such that U(x) ≥ CMx−1 for x ≤ M.
Together with the first-order condition X˜−1T = y˜
T Y˜T with y˜T ≡ 1 and (3.7), it follows
that
E[U(X˜T ) I{X˜T≤M}] ≥ CM E[(X˜T )−1 I{X˜T≤M}] = CME[Y˜T I{X˜T≤M}]→ 0,
as T →∞. Therefore (5.8) and in turn (5.7) is confirmed in both cases, completing the
proof of Theorem 2.4. 
5.1. Proof of Proposition 5.3. This section concludes the proof of Theorem 2.4 in the
case p = 0, by establishing the auxiliary Proposition 5.3. In all the following proofs,
the superscript T in X˜T , XT , Y T , and Y˜ T is omitted to ease notation. We begin with
the analogue of Lemma 4.4:
LEMMA 5.4 Let p = 0 and suppose Assumptions 2.1 - 2.3 hold. Then
lim
T→∞
yT
y˜T
= 1,
where y˜T ≡ 1 as we have seen before (cf. Footnote 15).
Proof. The proof follows the argument in Lemma 4.4, where many estimates are sim-
plified when p = 0. Indeed, on the one hand, the same estimate as in (4.7) yields
1 ≤ 1 + 
yT
E
[
XT
XT
I{XT≥M}
]
+E[XTYT I{XT<M}] ≤
1 + 
yT
+E[XTYT I{XT<M}].
Here, the second term vanishes as T →∞ due to (3.7), so that
(5.9)
1
1 + 
≤ lim inf
T→∞
1
yT
.
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On the other hand, the same argument that leads to (4.11) also yields
1 = E
[
YT I(y
TYT ) I{yTYT≤δ}
]
+ E
[
YTXT I{yTYT>δ}
]
,
where the second term on the right-hand side vanishes as T →∞ by the same reasoning
as after (4.11). Concerning the first term, (3.6) for p = 0 shows that I(y) ≥ (1− )y−1
for any y < δ and some sufficiently small δ. Therefore:
E
[
YT I(y
TYT ) I{yTYT≤δ}
] ≥ (1−)P(yTYT ≤ δ)
yT
=
1− 
yT
− 1− 
yT
P(yTYT > δ).
Here the second term also tends to zero because
1
yT
P(yTYT > δ) = E
[
YT
yTYT
I{yTYT>δ}
]
≤ δ−1 E[YT ]→ 0,
due to (3.7). Combining the above estimates, we obtain
(5.10)
1
1−  ≥ lim supT→∞
1
yT
.
Thus, the assertion follows by combining (5.9) and (5.10) because ε was arbitrary. 
Using the previous results, we can now verify the first two items of Proposition 5.3.
LEMMA 5.5 Let p = 0 and suppose Assumptions 2.1 - 2.3 hold. Then:
P− lim
T→∞
X˜TT =∞ and P− lim
T→∞
XTT =∞.
Proof. Recall the numeraire property (4.5) of the log-optimal portfolio X˜:
E[XˆT /X˜T ] ≤ 1 for any T and any admissible payoff Xˆ . The first part of the as-
sertion in turn follows verbatim as in the derivation of (4.6), where PT is replaced by
P. As for the second part of the assertion, for any N > 0, there exists yN such that
I(y) > N for y ≤ yN . Here, yN is chosen sufficiently small so that −∂V (y) is single
valued and is denoted by I(y) for y ≤ yN . For the chosen N ,
P(XT ≤ N) ≤ P(XT ≤ N, yTYT ≤ yN ) + P(yTYT > yN ).
The second term on the right-hand side vanishes as T → ∞, due to (3.7),
limT→∞ yT /y˜T = 1, and y˜T ≡ 1 (cf. Lemma 5.4). The first term is identically
zero, because XT = I(yTYT ) > N on {yTYT ≤ yN}. Therefore, the second part of
the assertion follows. 
To complete the proof of Proposition 5.3, it remains to verify Item iii). To this end,
some auxiliary results are established first.
LEMMA 5.6 Suppose Assumptions 2.1 - 2.3 hold for p = 0. Then:
P− lim
T→∞
XTT Y
T
T = 1.
Proof. For any  > 0, the convergence of the ratio of marginal utilities (2.2) implies the
existence of M such that U(x) is differentiable beyond M and, moreover, xU ′(x) ≥
1− /2 for x ≥M. For such a M,
(5.11) P(XTYT ≤ 1− ) ≤ P(XTYT ≤ 1− ,XT ≥M) + P(XT < M).
In view of Lemma 5.5, the second term on the right-hand side vanishes as T →∞. To
estimate the first term, recall that YT = U ′(XT )/yT on {XT ≥ M}. As a result, for
T ≥ T∗,
P(XTYT ≤ 1− ,XT ≥M) = P
(
XTU
′(XT ) ≤ yT (1− ), XT ≥M
)
≤ P(1− /2 ≤ yT (1− )),
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where the inequality holds because XTU ′(XT ) ≥ 1 − /2 on {XT ≥ M}. Since
limT→∞ yT = 1 by Lemma 5.4, the above estimates imply
lim
T→∞
P(XTYT ≤ 1− ,XT ≥M) = 0.
Coming back to (5.11), this gives limT→∞ P(XTYT ≤ 1 − ) = 0. Along the same
lines, limT→∞ P(XTYT ≥ 1 + ) = 0 follows, completing the proof. 
COROLLARY 5.7 Let p = 0 and suppose Assumptions 2.1 - 2.3 hold. Then:
lim
T→∞
E[|XTT Y TT − 1|] = 0.
Proof. By the convergence in probability established in the previous lemma and
E[XTT Y TT ] = 1, this follows from Scheffe’s lemma (Williams, 1991, 5.5.10). 
Set rT = XTT /X˜
T
T . The following estimate is a key to prove Proposition 5.3 iii).
LEMMA 5.8 Let p = 0 and suppose Assumptions 2.1 - 2.3 hold. Then:
lim
T→∞
E
[∣∣∣∣1− XTT Y TTrT
∣∣∣∣ |rT − 1|] = 0.
Proof. Recall the first-order condition y˜T Y˜T = X˜−1T . As 1 = E[Y˜T X˜T ] ≥ E[Y˜TXT ],
it follows that
E[X˜−1T (XT − X˜T )] ≤ 0.
Similarly, 1 = E[YTXT ] ≥ E[YT X˜T ] yields
E[YT (X˜T −XT )] ≤ 0.
Summing up the previous two inequalities and using the definition rT = XTT /X˜
T
T gives
(5.12) 0 ≥ E[(X˜−1T − YT )(XT − X˜T )] = E
[(
1− XTYT
rT
)
(rT − 1)
]
.
Observe that (1−XTYT /rT )(rT−1) ≤ 0 whenXTYT ≤ rT ≤ 1 or 1 ≤ rT ≤ XTYT .
Therefore,
E
[((
1− XTYT
rT
)
(rT − 1)
)
−
]
≤ E
[(
1− XTYT
rT
)
(1− rT ) I{XTYT≤rT≤1 or 1≤rT≤XTYT }
]
.
Since E[((1−XTYT /rT )(rT − 1))+] ≤ E[((1−XTYT /rT )(rT − 1))−] by (5.12), it
follows that
E
[∣∣∣∣1− XTYTrT
∣∣∣∣ |rT − 1|]
≤ 2E
[(
1− XTYT
rT
)
(1− rT ) I{XTYT≤rT≤1 or 1≤rT≤XTYT }
]
.
(5.13)
Now, estimate the expectation on the right-hand side. On the set {XTYT ≤ rT ≤ 1}
we have (1−XTYT /rT )(1− rT ) ≤ (1−XTYT )2, so that
E
[(
1− XTYT
rT
)
(1− rT ) I{XTYT≤rT≤1}
]
≤ E [(1−XTYT )2 I{XTYT≤1}]
≤ E[(1−XTYT )2 I{XTYT≤1−}] + E[(1−XTYT )2 I{1−<XTYT≤1}]
≤ P(XTYT ≤ 1− ) + 2, for any  > 0.
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Lemma 5.6 shows that the first term on the right vanishes as T → ∞. Since  was
chosen arbitrarily, this yields
(5.14) lim
T→∞
E
[(
1− XTYT
rT
)
(1− rT ) I{XTYT≤rT≤1}
]
= 0.
On {1 ≤ rT ≤ XTYT } we have XTYT /rT + rT ≥ 2 and in turn
(1−XTYT /rT )(1− rT ) ≤ XTYT − 1.
As a consequence:
E
[(
1− XTYT
rT
)
(1− rT ) I{1≤rT≤XTYT }
]
= E
[(
1− XTYT
rT
)
(1− rT ) I{1≤rT≤XTYT ,XTYT≤1+}
]
+ E
[(
1− XTYT
rT
)
(1− rT ) I{1≤rT≤XTYT ,XTYT>1+}
]
≤ E [(1−XTYT )2 I{1≤rT≤XTYT ,XTYT≤1+}]+ E [(XTYT − 1) I{XTYT>1+}]
≤ 2 + E[|XTYT − 1|].
Since  was chosen arbitrarily and the second term on the right-hand side converges to
0 by Corollary 5.7, we obtain
(5.15) lim
T→∞
E
[(
1− XTYT
rT
)
(1− rT ) I{1≤rT≤XTYT }
]
= 0.
Together, (5.13), (5.14) and (5.15) yield the assertion. 
We are now ready to complete the proof of Proposition 5.3 iii).
Proof of Proposition 5.3 iii). Lemma 5.8 implies
P− lim
T→∞
(1−XTYT /rT )(1− rT ) = 0.
Combined with Lemma 5.6, this yields the assertion P− limT→∞ rT = 1. 
6. ANALYSIS OF THE COUNTEREXAMPLE
In this section, we provide a detailed analysis of the counterexample from Sec-
tion 2.3. Recall that U(x) = xp/p, p < 0 for sufficiently large x and U(x) = xp
∗
/p∗,
p∗ < p− 1, for x ≤ 1. In what follows, we will show that if (2.15) is satisfied, then
(6.1) lim
T→∞
E[U(X˜T )]
E[U˜(X˜T )]
=∞ and lim sup
T→∞
E[U(XT )]
E[U˜(X˜T )]
≤ 1.
Hence
(6.2) lim
T→∞
E[U(X˜T )]
E[U(XT )]
=∞,
which confirms (2.14) since U is regularly varying at infinity (cf. Lemma 3.1). Indeed,
set aT = U−1(E[U(X˜T )]) and bT = U−1(E[U(XT )]). If lim supT→∞ E[U(X˜T )]
is bounded away from zero, then lim supT→∞ aT < ∞. However, U(∞) = 0
and limT→∞ S0T = ∞ yield 0 ≥ E[U(XT )] ≥ E[U(S0T )] → 0 as T →
∞, hence limT→∞ bT = ∞. Therefore limT→∞ aT /bT = 0 holds. When
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limT→∞ E[U(X˜T )] = 0, then limT→∞ aT = ∞. If there exists δ > 0 such that
lim infT→∞ aT /bT ≥ δ, then
lim sup
T→∞
U(aT )
U(bT )
≤ lim sup
T→∞
U(δbT )
U(bT )
= δp <∞
because U ≤ 0, which contradicts (6.2).
To prove the first convergence in (6.1), it suffices to show
(6.3) lim
T→∞
E[X˜p
∗
T I{X˜T≤1}]
E[X˜pT ]
=∞.
In the Black-Scholes model, the optimal risky weight for power utility U˜(x) = xp/p is
p˜i = 11−p
µ
σ2 . The associated wealth process starting from unit initial capital is
X˜T = exp
((
r +
1− 2p
2(1− p)2
µ2
σ2
)
T +
1
1− p
µ
σ
WT
)
.
Straightforward calculations show
(6.4)
X˜p
∗
T
E[X˜pT ]
= exp
(
(p∗ − p)rT +
(
p∗(1− 2p+ p∗)
2(1− p)2 +
1
2
q
)
µ2
σ2
T
)
E
(
p∗
1− p
µ
σ
WT
)
,
where q = p/(p− 1). Define a new probability measure Q∗ via
dQ∗
dP
|FT = E
(
p∗
1− p
µ
σ
WT
)
.
Then, W ∗t = Wt − p
∗
1−p
µ
σ t is a Q
∗-Brownian motion on [0, T ]. As a result,
EP
[
E
(
p∗
1− p
µ
σ
WT
)
I{X˜T≤1}
]
= Q∗
(
1
1− p
µ
σ
WT ≤ −
(
r +
1− 2p
2(1− p)2
µ2
σ2
)
T
)
= Q∗
(
1
1− p
µ
σ
W ∗T ≤ −rT −
1− 2p+ 2p∗
2(1− p)2
µ2
σ2
T
)
= Q∗
(
1
1− p
µ
σ
W ∗T√
T
≤ −r
√
T − 1− 2p+ 2p
∗
2(1− p)2
µ2
σ2
√
T
)
.
Observe that
−r − 1− 2p+ 2p
∗
2(1− p)2
µ2
σ2
> −r + 1
2(1− p)2
µ2
σ2
> 0,
where the first inequality follows from p∗ < p− 1 and the second inequality holds due
to µ2/σ2 > 2(1− p)2r in (2.15). As a consequence:
lim
T→∞
EP
[
E
(
p∗
1− p
µ
σ
WT
)
IX˜T≤1
]
= lim
T→∞
Q∗
(
1
1− p
µ
σ
W ∗T√
T
≤ −r
√
T − 1− 2p+ 2p
∗
2(1− p)2
µ2
σ2
√
T
)
= 1.
(6.5)
For the exponential factor on the right-hand side of (6.4), note that
p∗(1− 2p+ p∗)
2(1− p)2 +
1
2
q > 0
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because p∗(1 − 2p + p∗) is strictly decreasing in p∗ when p∗ < p − 1. If (2.15) is
satisfied, it follows that
(6.6)
(p∗ − p)r +
(
p∗(1− 2p+ p∗)
2(1− p)2 +
1
2
q
)
µ2
σ2
= (p∗ − p)
(
r +
p∗ + 1− p
2(1− p)2
µ2
σ2
)
> 0,
so that the exponential term on the right-hand side of (6.4) diverges as T →∞. There-
fore, (6.3) is obtained after taking into account (6.5).
Now, consider the second convergence in (6.1). Let us first prove
(6.7) lim
T→∞
E[U(XT ) I{XT≤M}]
E[X˜p/p]
= 0.
Since the market is complete, there exists a common stochastic discount factor Y
and yT , y˜T > 0 such that U ′(XT ) = yTYT and X˜
p−1
T = y˜
TYT . Hence, XT =
I
(
yT
y˜T
X˜p−1T
)
, where I = (U ′)−1. Define U∗(T, x) := U
(
I
(
yT
y˜T
xp−1
))
. Recall that
U(x) = xp
∗
/p∗ for small x. Therefore,
U∗(T, x) =
1
p∗
(
yT
y˜T
) p∗
p∗−1
x
p−1
p∗−1p
∗
, for small x.
On the other hand, there exists T0 such that 1/2 ≤ yT /y˜T ≤ 2 for any T ≥ T0 due to
Lemma 4.7. As a result, (2.3) is satisfied when U is replaced by U∗, i.e.
lim inf
x↓0
U∗(T, x)
xp−1
= lim inf
x↓0
1
p∗
(
yT
y˜T
) p∗
p∗−1
x
p−1
p∗−1 = 0, for T > T0,
where the second convergence holds because p∗ < p − 1 < 0. It then follows from
Remark 4.6 that
lim
T→∞
E[U(XT ) I{XT<M}]
E[X˜pT /p]
= lim
T→∞
E
[
U∗(T, X˜T ) I{X˜T≤(U ′(M)y˜T /yT )1/(p−1)}
]
E[X˜pT /p]
= 0,(6.8)
for any M > 0. On the other hand, fix a > 0. For any  > 0 there is Ma, such that
1−  ≤ U ′(x)/(a+ x)p−1 ≤ 1 +  for x ≥Ma,. Then (4.27) follows, and the second
inequality therein yields
(6.9)
E[U(XT )]
E[X˜pT /p]
≤ E[U(XT ) I{XT<Ma,}]
E[X˜pT /p]
+ (1 + )
E
[
(a+XT )
p I{XT≥Ma,}
]
E[X˜pT ]
,
where the first term on the right-hand side vanishes as T → ∞ due to (6.8). For the
second term, use (4.22) with limT→∞ yT /y˜T = 1 and y˜T = E[X˜pT ], to obtain
lim sup
T→∞
E
[
(a+XT )
p I{XT≥M}
]
E[X˜pT ]
≤ 1
1−  .
In summary, the estimates for the two terms on the right side of (6.9) yield
lim sup
T→∞
E[U(XT )]
E[X˜pT /p]
≤ 1 + 
1−  .
which confirms the second convergence in (6.1) since  was chosen arbitrarily.
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